



                                                                   
ANDY STAHL∗ 
Symposium Speech:  Fire Ecology 101 for 
Lawyers 
Our nation is fighting a war.  Like Korea, we defend hills from the 
enemy, only to give them up in the next campaign.1  As in the War to 
End All Wars, defensive lines are built helter-skelter across the land-
 
 
∗ Andy Stahl is Executive Director of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics, 
a nationwide non-profit conservation group.  Stahl, a forester, has worked for the USDA-
Forest Service, Associated Oregon Loggers, National Wildlife Federation, and Sierra Club 
Legal Defense Fund.  Among his accomplishments is the northern spotted owl campaign 
that protected about eight million acres of public ancient forest. 
1 For a gripping account of the ebb and flow battle over the Korean highlands, see U.S. 
ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORy, The Korean War: Years of Stalemate, at 
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/kw-stale/stale.htm (last modified Oct. 3, 2003).  
The author describes one battle: 
The attack began on 13 September and quickly deteriorated into a familiar pat-
tern.  First, American aircraft, tanks, and artillery would pummel the ridge for 
hours on end, turning the already barren hillside into a cratered moonscape.  
Next, the 23d’s infantrymen would clamber up the mountain’s rocky slopes, tak-
ing out one enemy bunker after another by direct assault.  Those who survived to 
reach the crest arrived exhausted and low on ammunition.  Then the inevitable 
counterattack would come-wave after wave of North Koreans determined to re-
capture the lost ground at any cost.  Many of these counterattacks were con-
ducted at night by fresh troops that the enemy was able to bring up under the 
shelter of neighboring hills.  Battles begun by bomb, bullet, and shell were inevi-
tably finished by grenade, trench knife, and fist as formal military engagements 
degenerated into desperate hand-to-hand brawls.  Sometimes dawn broke to re-
veal the defenders still holding the mountaintop.  Just as often, however, the en-
emy was able to overwhelm the tired and depleted Americans, tumbling the sur-
vivors back down the hill where, after a brief pause to rest, replenish 
ammunition, and absorb replacements, they would climb back up the ridge to re-
peat the process all over again. 
Id. 
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scape, only to see them outflanked or overrun.2  Like in Vietnam, 
bombers drop toxic chemicals to deny the enemy fuel and sustenance, 
and scorched-earth battle tactics burn the landscape to save it.3  As in 
the Persian Gulf, the more we fight, the more we foster the conditions 
that fuel the conflict.4  Like all wars, a military/industrial complex of 
mercenaries, contractors, and politicians that depends upon continued 
hostilities grows ever stronger and more wedded to the fight.5
 
 
2 World War I stalemated into trench warfare after the Germans failed to force the French 
into an early surrender.  Rather than retreat, they dug into trenches that eventually ex-
tended from the North Sea to Switzerland.  See Wars and Conflict, World War I, at 
http://www.bbc.co. uk/history/3d/trench.shtml (last visited July 18, 2004).  Describing the 
defensive nature of World War I, the author notes: 
The trenches on both sides were protected by lines of barbed wire with No-Man’s 
Land in-between.  The shelling churned the landscape into a sea of mud and cra-
ters.  As machine guns could bring concentrated fire to bear on any attacking 
troops, few attacks were successful.  Most military offensives ended with few 
gains and enormous casualties.  On the first day of the Battle of the Somme in 
1916, the British Army lost around 20,000 men.  The offensive cost the Allies 




3 Agent Orange was the most notorious of the chemical weapons used in Vietnam.  See 
Arthur W. Galston, Falling Leaves and Ethical Dilemmas: Agent Orange in Vietnam, IN-
STITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND POL’Y STUDIES, 1999-2001, at http://www.yale.edu/isps/ jour-
nal/volume2/galston.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).  Galston describes the use of Agent 
Orange in Vietnam: 
During the Vietnam war, approximately 100 million pounds of this mixture, ap-
plied as a 25 lb./acre spray released over a broad swath of forest by groups of 
fixed-wing aircraft, were used in planned defoliation operations.  This operation, 
known as “Ranch Hand,” had as its jaunty motto “Only you can prevent a for-
est.”  In addition to Agent Orange, formulations of other herbicides were em-
ployed for specific purposes, like the selective killing of rice, but Agent Orange 
was by far the most popular herbicide used in Vietnam. 
Id. 
 
4 See, e.g., Ivan Eland, Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism?  The Historical 
Record, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 50 (Dec. 17, 1998), at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb50.pdf (last visited July 18, 2004).  Eland describes 
how the “numerous incidents cataloged suggest that the United States could reduce the 
chances of such devastating—and potentially catastrophic—terrorist attacks by adopting a 
policy of military restraint overseas.”  Id. at 1. 
 
5 President Dwight D. Eisenhower cautioned against the rise of the Military-Industrial 
complex: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwar-
ranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.  The 
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”  President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (Jan. 17, 1961), available at 
http://www.eisenhower. archives.gov/farewell.htm (last visited July 18, 2004). 
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It is our war on wildland fire; a war that started in 1910 and has 
seen over 900 fighters killed in combat—comparable to U.S. casual-
ties in the Iraq War.6  In the war on fire, the hills we save from burn-
ing today will burn tomorrow.7  While fighting our battles against 
fire, we build defensive lines by hand and with heavy equipment.  Al-
though such lines can be successful in stopping the advance of less 
than severe fires, a wind-whipped crown fire will overcome any fire 
line.8  The Forest Service, the preeminent wildland firefighting 
agency, dumps an average of 15 million gallons of aerial fire retardant 
annually.  Fire retardants are toxic to trout and other fish species, es-
pecially certain formulations that include sodium ferrocyanide as a 
corrosion inhibitor. 
We fight the war on fire to win.  But what does winning mean 
when nature is our enemy?  What would a victory over wildland fire 
look like if we were to achieve it? Is victory achievable?  And if so, at 
what cost in lives and money? 
In the war’s early years, the army of wildland firefighters deployed 
by state and federal governments appeared to enjoy initial success.  
Beginning in the early 1950s, lands burned by wildfires dropped dra-
matically, to about twenty percent of pre-1950s levels.  Smokey 
Bear’s troops appeared to be winning the war to eradicate fire from 
our forests. 
Then a funny thing happened in the last ten years.  The tide turned.  
The enemy went on the offensive, and average annual acreage burned 
 
 
6 By the end of 2003, 913 wildland firefighters had lost their lives.  National Interagency 
Fire Center, Wildland Fire Accidents by Year, at http://www.nifc.gov/reports/ year.pdf 
(last visited July 18, 2004).  In the Iraq War 894 allied fighters had died as of July 18, 
2004.  Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, at http://icasualties.org.oif/ (last visited July 18, 
2004). 
 
7 In the summer of 2001, the Forest Service spent 2.6 million dollars to contain the light-
ning-caused Craggy fire deep in the heart of Oregon’s Kalmiopsis Wilderness to only 275 
acres burned.  Paul Fattig, Feds Waste Money By Fighting Too Many Fires, Group Says, 
MAIL TRIBUNE, Sept. 27, 2001, available at http://www.mailtribune.com/archive/ 
2001/september/092701n1.htm (last visited July 18, 2004).  One year later, the lightning-
caused Biscuit fire burned over the entire Kalmiopsis Wilderness, including the forests that 
had been saved from fire the previous year. 
 
8 The 2002 Rodeo-Chediski fire jumped over 25 logging roads before reaching its full size 
of 467,000 acres.  Peter Morrison and Kirsten Harma, Analysis of Land Ownership and 
Prior Land Management Activities Within the Rodeo & Chediski Fires, Arizona, (July 7, 
2002), at http://www.pacificbio.org/RodeoChediskiFires8July2002lowres.pdf (last visited 
July 18, 2004). 
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increased by thirty percent over each of the three preceding decades.9  
The fire/industrial complex, supported by the Western Governors’ 
Association, responded with pleas for more federal money to escalate 
the war.  Firefighting costs topped one billion dollars for the first time 
in 2000, but over eight million acres still burned—the worst year 
since 1960.10
Something seems to be going terribly wrong with the war.  Far 
from eradicating fire from forests, the war appears only to have em-
boldened the enemy.  To understand why, we need to examine the 
psychology of the enemy, what scientists call the ecology of fire. 
Fire frequency, intensity, and size vary from place to place because 
of differences in climate.  Forests in the northern tier states (Maine, 
Vermont, New Hampshire, northern New York, and the northern lake 
states), westside Pacific Coast states, and high elevation mountain 
ranges (Cascades, Sierras, and Rockies) burn infrequently (several 
hundred years between fire events on a given acre) and, when they do 
burn, replace the forest stand.  Our one hundred year war on fire has 
had only modest effects on the ecology of these wet, cold forests.  
These forests will still burn when climatic conditions are sufficiently 
dry, and they will do so in a manner that kills most of the trees. 
At the other end of the spectrum are forests of the lower elevation 
interior West, southern pine states from Texas to Florida, lower eleva-
tion Sierra mountains, and dry grasslands of the western Great Basin 
and interior California.  These lands, when left to their own devices, 
burn frequently (every three to five years), generally removing fine 
fuels and leaving mature trees.  The war on fire has had a dramatic ef-
fect on the structure and ecology of these dry lands.  Tree densities 
have increased ten to one hundred fold in the absence of fire’s natural 
thinning.  Rangeland juniper has moved from its accustomed location 
in rocky slopes into valley bottoms where it is displacing sagebrush 
and other shrubs and grasses. 
It is in these chronically dry forests that the war on fire has had the 
unintended consequences of increasing fire’s intensity.  The war has 
suppressed the regular schedule of frequent, low-intensity fires.  Now 
it takes only a small handful of insurgent fires that escape initial at-
 
9 Average annual acreage burned was 4.8 million between 1993 and 2003; 3.7 million be-
tween 1983 and 1993; 3.7 million between 1973 and 1983; and 3.9 million between 1963 
and 1973.  National Interagency Fire Center, Wildland Fire Statistics, at 
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tack to create stand-replacing conflagrations covering hundreds of 
thousands of acres at a time.  Although our fighting forces claim 
ninety-eight percent success in suppressing fires in these dry forests,11 
the two percent that escape do so as if armed with weapons of mass 
destruction—weapons of wood and brush built up over decades of fire 
suppression. 
Between these two extremes lie the preponderance of forests where 
fire variety is typical—sometimes small and cool, other times large 
and hot, most times some of each mixed in a mosaic of burn intensi-
ties.  Our war on fire in these forests may have only shifted the bal-
ance away from smaller, cooler fires to larger, hotter fires. 
Moisture distinguishes forests that burn frequently from forests that 
do so rarely.  Chronically wet forests burn rarely, only during periods 
of sufficiently extreme drought to dry out the woods.  Chronically dry 
forests would burn frequently, if left to their own devices.  In other 
words, the amount of wood, the biomass, in a forest is largely irrele-
vant to whether the forest will burn.  Lots of wet wood, typical of 
Alaska’s Tongass National Forest where fires are unknown, won’t 
burn at all, whereas even a small amount of dry grass can burn fero-
ciously. 
The answer to what’s gone wrong with our war on fire is to be 
found in studying our nation’s climate during the one hundred year 
war.  Climates vary on decades-long cycles that are strongly influ-
enced by complex processes in the world’s oceans.  When it appeared 
during the mid-twentieth century that our troops were winning the 
war on fire, in reality, the enemy was simply hunkered down by a wet 
climate, biding its time until conditions were ripe for an offensive.  
With the continent-wide drought that began in the 1990s, fires quickly 
overwhelmed our fighting forces.  Unless, and until, we learn how to 
control droughts, the war against fire will ebb and flow with the 
weather. 
There is an alternative to war. As in Bosnia, our primary justifica-
tion for continued fighting is to protect innocent civilians and their 
homes from death and destruction.  Whether a home burns depends 
upon its construction materials and the immediate landscape within 
one hundred feet of the house.  Building homes with fire-resistant ma-
terials and keeping yards clear of flammable brush is the best protec-
 
11 Les Rosenkrance, Testimony before the Senate Energy Committee, Subcommittee on 
Forests and Public Land Management (June 29, 1999), available at http://www.doi. 
gov/ocl/fire.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2004). 
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tion against home losses to wildland fires.  As Forest Service fire sci-
entist Jack Cohen explains, “Unlike a flash flood or an avalanche 
where a mass engulfs objects in its path, fire spreads because the loca-
tions along the path meet the requirements for combustion.”12  Re-
move the requirements for combustion and fire stops. 
The path to ending our war on wildland fire begins with removing 
civilians from the field of battle.  Then we can call for an end to the 
war honorably, secure in the knowledge that our children are safe and 
nature can take care of her own. 
 
12 Jack D. Cohen, What is the Wildland Fire Threat to Homes?,  Thompson Memorial Lec-
ture (Apr. 10, 2000), at http://www.firelab.org/fbp/fbppubs/fbppdf/cohen/homeig.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2004). 
